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Like Oil and Water: The Past, Present,
and Future of American Waterways Operators,
Inc. v. Askew in the Ongoing Federal-State
Relationship in Regulating Oil Spill Recovery
American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F.
Supp. 1241 (1971)
by Zack Smith
ederal and state attempts to regulate recovery for oil spill
damages often go together as well as oil and water. Given
the recent large-scale and well-publicized Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, 1 the federal-state relationship in regulating oil
spill recovery has once again come to the forefront after spending
nearly two decades on the backburner since the Exxon Valdez
incident in 1989. 2 However, the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida (Middle District) was forced to deal
with this federal-state relationship long before either of these
events occurred. 3 In 1971, the Middle District took up the case of
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1
Sheila Pulham etal.,BPOilSpill:AnlnteractiveTimeline, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28,2010),
http:/ / www.guardian.co.uk/ environment/ interactive / 2010 / jul/08/ bp-oilspill- timeline-in teractive.
2
See Exxon Valdez, EPA, http://epa.gov/ oem / content/learning/ exxon.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012). See generally William H. Rodgers et al., The Exxon
Valdez Reopener: Natural Resources Damage Sett/,ements and Roads Not Taken, 22
ALASKA L. REv. i35 (2005) (exploring the course oflitigation in the wake of
the Exxon Valdez incident and providing guidance for future oil spill recovery
efforts).
3
Am. Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1244 (1971).
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American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, where it was asked by a
conglomerate of shipping interests to consider whether the Florida
Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act (Florida Act) 4 was
preempted by the federal Water Quality Improvement Act (Federal
Act) .5 In this instance, a threejudge panel of the Middle District6
held that the Florida Act was preempted and that Florida's state
statute was unconstitutional under Article III, Section 2, Clause I
of the United States Constitution because the states surrendered to
the federal government all power to enact substantive legislation
relating to admiralty and maritime matters. 7
Of course, this was not the first time that a federal court
was asked to consider whether a state statute affecting maritime
jurisdiction was constitutional. 8 In fact, this area of law has a
rich and distinguished history. As far back as 1872 in the case of
Steamboat Company v. Chase, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state
wrongful death statute which created a cause of action in state
court for wrongful deaths that occurred on navigable waterways

4

5
6

7
8

The Florida Statute read, in part:
Because it is the intent of this chapter to provide the means
for rapid and effective cleanup and to minimize damages, any
licensee and its agents or servants, including vessels destined for
or leaving a licensee 's terminal facility, who permits or suffers a
prohibited discharge or other polluting condition to take place
within state boundaries shall be liable to the state for all costs of
cleanup or other damage incurred by the state and for damages
resulting from injury to others. In any suit to enforce claims of the
state under this chapter, it shall not be necessary for the state to
plead or prove negligence in any form or manner on the part of
the licensee or any vessel. If the state is damaged by a discharge
prohibited by this chapter it need only plead and prove the fact of
the prohibited discharge or other polluting condition and that it
occurred. FLA. STAT.§ 376.12 (1973).
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1245-46.
A threejudge district court panel must be convened if a party is seeking an
interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by
an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes ... upon the
ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed
1976) . A threejudge panel was necessary in this instance because Section 2281
has been held to apply to any challenge of the constitutionality of a statewide
statute of general applicability. See ROBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMA '
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (4th ed. 1969).
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction .... "U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See infra notes 14-20.
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even though a similar cause of action in federal court did not exist
under federal maritime law. 9 In 1893, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in The City of Norwalk
held that states can legislate in the maritime area in order: (1) to
establish general rights for persons within the state's limits, (2) to
exercise police power, and (3) to establish maritime regulations of
a strictly local nature. 10
However, the trend of expanding states' rights to legislate in
the maritime domain was quickly curtailed by the U. S. Supreme
Court's decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. ]ensen.11 In Jensen, the
Supreme Court held that a state's workers' compensation statute,
when applied in the maritime context, interfered with the goal of
national uniformity of the laws affecting interstate commerce. 12 The
Court felt uniformity was mandated by the Constitution and that
it could only be promoted through exclusive federal jurisdiction
over maritime matters. 13 Thus, the Supreme Court declared the law
unconstitutional and struck it down .14 Congress was displeased with
this result, though, and passed legislation making federal maritime
jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims nonexclusive to
the federal government. 15 However, the Supreme Court, not to
be outdone, ruled this congressional grant of non-exclusivity itself
unconstitutional a few years later in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. 16
This was the background against which the Middle District
confronted the issue in Askew.
In Askew, the Middle District agreed that national uniformity of
the laws within the maritime context was paramount and relied on
the Supreme Court's decisions in Jensen and Knickerbockerto support
its conclusion. 17 The Middle District quickly dismissed Florida's two
primary arguments that the Florida Act was constitutional. First,
it addressed Florida's argument that the "gap theory" permits
certain state regulations pertaining to oil spill recovery where
federal regulations are inadequate. 18 The "gap theory" states that
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

See Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. 522, 533 (1872).
City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 106 (S.D.N.Y 1893).
244 U.S. 205, 218 (1918).
Id.
Id.at217.
Id. at 217-18.
Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395.
253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920).
Am. Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1248-49.
Id.
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where Congress fails to provide a comprehensive remedy in certain
situations, the states are free to fill in the gaps left by the federal
legislation with their own state-level legislation. 19
The Middle District rejected this argument based on the U. S.
Supreme Court's decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. This
case involved the application of Florida's wrongful death statute to
a longshoreman who was killed aboard a vessel while it was within
the navigable waters of the State of Florida. 20 Unfortunately for
the longshoreman and his family, maritime law did not provide a
remedy, or any recovery, for his death. 21 So, Florida attempted to
apply its wrongful death statute to the situation.22 The Supreme
Court struck down such an application, however, and concluded
that the absence of a "federal statute or a maritime rule on the
subject [does not compel] the conclusion that state law must
govern." 23 The Court remanded the case and ordered the district
court to shape an adequate remedy under maritime law. 24 The
Middle District analogized Moragne to the case before it in Askew
and concluded that if the states are precluded from legislating
in the maritime area when there is not a federal statute on point
dealing with an issue, then they surely must be barred from
legislating when there is a federal statute on point dealing with a
particular maritime matter. 25
Second, the Middle District rejected Florida's argument that
the "savings clause" of the Federal Act allowed the state to enact the
Florida Act. 26 The Federal Act stated that "Nothing in this section
shall be construed as preempting any State or political subdivision
thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with respect
to the discharge of oil into any waters within such State." 27 The
Middle District, relying on Knickerbocker stated that "it has long
been recognized that Congress is powerless to confer on the states

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Brief for Appellant at 83-84, Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325 (1973) ( o. 71-1082), 1971WL134330, at *83.
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1248-49; see also Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 376 (1970).
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 375.
Id.
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1249 (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 375) .
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1249.
Id.
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (o) (2) (1970)).
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authority to legislate within the admiralty jurisdiction." 28 Even
so, the Middle District did not read the "savings clause" of the
Federal Act as a congressional attempt to confer upon the states
this power, but rather read it as simply stating that the states are
free to "enforce pollution control measures that are within their
constitutional prerogative." 29 The Middle District did not find the
Florida Act to be within the state's constitutional prerogative, and
thus struck down the Florida Act in its entirety. 30
However, the State of Florida appealed directly to the U. S.
Supreme Court. 31 Upon hearing the case, the Court reversed
the Middle District's decision and held that the Florida Act was
not preempted by the Federal Act. 32 Weighing heavily on the U.
S. Supreme Court's decision was the fact that the Federal Act
specifically contained the "savings clause." 33 The Supreme Court
seemed to soften its own prior holding in Knickerbocker by holding
that such "savings clauses" which allow states to legislate in the oil
spill recovery domain are okay as long as they make clear that the
state legislation must be consistent with the federal legislation. 34

28
29
30
31

32
33
34

Id. at 1249 (citing Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 170).
Id.
Id. at 1249-50.
Under the applicable statute, where a threejudge district court panel hears a
case for an interlocutory appeal in any civil action where such a threejudge
panel is required, the party to whom the decision is adverse may directly appeal
the decision to the United States Supreme Court. See28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006).
The importance of tl1is case to the states, as a whole, can be seen by the large
number of amicus briefs other states submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court
supporting Florida's position. See e.g. Brief for the State of Georgia as Amicus
Curiae, Askew V. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (No. 711082) , 1972 WL 136393; Brief for the State of Hawaii as Amicus Curiae, Askew
v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL
136391; Brieffor the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Askew v. Am. Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136387; Brieffor
the State of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae, Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators,
Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136390; Brief of the State
of Texas as Amicus Curiae, Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136396; Brief of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, Amicus Curiae, on Behalf of the Appellants, Askew v. Am. Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (no. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136392; Amicus
Curiae Brieffor the State of Washington, Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc.,
411 U.S.325 (1973) (No. 71-1082), 1972 WL 136395.
Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 331-32.
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The Supreme Court also rejected the Middle District's
repudiation of the "gap theory,'' by relying on a theory that was
p.ot mentioned in the Middle District's decision, namely that the
traditional police powers of the State of Florida were sufficient to
allow the state to regulate recovery from oil spills which occurred
within the state's territorial waters. 35 Beginning with the appeal from
the Middle District's decision in Askew, the Court retreated from
its stance that all laws affecting maritime matters are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and has again shown
a willingness to revert to its very early non-exclusivity positions. 36
Due to the passage of time, the Federal Act is no longer the
primary statute through which oil spill recovery is regulated. 37
After the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, Congress passed the
comprehensive Oil Pollution Act (OPA) which regulates recovery
for damages from oil spills. 38 The OPA also contains "savings
clauses" similar to those found in the Federal Act. 39 Just as the
Federal Act's "savings clauses" were at issue in Askew, so too have
OPA's non-preemption provisions, or savings clauses, been a
frequent source of friction between federal and state attempts at
regulation, 40 and much litigation has resulted from this friction. 41
As a result of this litigation, and the precedent set by the Supreme
Court's decision in the appeal from the Middle District's decision
in Askew, a consensus has developed that states may enact statutes
that impose liability for oil spills that go beyond the liability

35

36

37
38
39
40

41

Id. at 336; for a broader discussion of state police powers within the maritime
context, see Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 273, 284
( 1999).
See generally Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) (allowing a state
wrongful death statute to govern an admiralty action after a determination
that its application would not harm the uniformity of admiralty law).
See Oil PollutionActofl990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 420l(a), 104 Stat. 484, 523
(codified at33 U.S.C. § 132l(c) (2006)).
Patrick Nash, The Adequacy of the Oil Pollution Acts Compensation Scheme in the
Case of a Catastrophic Oil Spill, 7]. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 105, I 05 ( 1991).
See Oil Pollution Act ofl990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 1018(a) (1), 104 Stat. 484,
505 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1) (2006) ).
See Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the Second Decade, 36 TuL. MAR. LJ.
I, 25-26, 48-49 ( 20 I I) (examining disputes relating to OPA's jurisdictional
limits as well as the statute's presentment requirement).
Id. at 48.
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limits established by the federal OPA. 42 Further, this litigation
has established that private individuals may recover under these
state statutes, especially those individuals who suffer non-physical
shoreside injuries, which in large-scale oil spills is likely to affect a
significant number of individuals. 43
The Supreme Court's decision overturning the Middle
District's decision in Askew is still good law and has recently gained
even more importance, and renewed interest, after almost forty
years since it was originally issued. This revival is due, in large part,
to suits that have developed from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
that began on April 20, 2010, 44 when the Deepwater Horizon oil
rig exploded, collapsed into the Gulf of Mexico, and eventually
spilled approximately 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf,
making it by far the largest oil spill to ever occur in U.S. waters. 45
By comparison, the Exxon Valdez incident spilled eleven million
gallons of oil into the waters in, and surrounding, Prince William
Sound with only the state of Alaska being affected by this spill. 46 In
addition to catastrophic spills such as these, smaller oil spills occur
within federal and state waters on a regular basis. 47 The U.S. Coast
Guard estimates that a minimum of 1.3 million gallons of oil are
spilled into U.S. waterways each year. 48 As a result of the frequency
of these spills, at least twenty-five states have statutes providing for
the recovery of damages that result from oil spills. 49
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana (Eastern District) which
is handling the multi-district litigation (MDL) consisting of

42
43
44

45
46
47

48
49

See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000) (citing Askew v. Am.
Waterways Operators, Inc. 411 U.S. 325, 332 (1973)).
Injuries of this type could include property damage, loss of business revenue,
etc. See id.
Dr. Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability, 86
WASH. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2011) (detailing the blowout and asserting that "while
the flow has stopped, the legal saga has only just begun").
Id.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476-78 (2008).
David lvanovich & Kristen Hays, Offshore Drilling Safer, but Small Spills Routine:
Hurricanes Can Pose Particular R isks, Hous. CHRON., July 20, 2008, at Al,
available at http: / / www.chron.com / business/ article/ Offshore-drilling-saferbu t-small-spills-routine-1589037.php.
Oil Spills, FUEL ECONOMY.Gov, http:/ / www.fueleconomy.gov/ feg/oilspills.
shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
See Nash, supra note 29, at 110.
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"hundreds of consolidated cases, with thousands of claimants,'' 50
arising from the Deepwater Horizon spill, has indicated a hostility
~oward allowing state statutes to be applied in conjunction with
OPA and other federal maritime laws in order to permit states
and individuals with a right to recover under those state statutes. 51
Thus, its position is closer to the Middle District's decision in Askew
than it is to the Supreme Court's decision in the appeal from the
Middle District's decision.
In justifying its results, the Eastern District emphasized the
Supreme Court's Jensen and Knickerbocker line of cases which
themselves emphasize the need for harmony and uniformity in
federal maritime rules, 52 just as the Middle District did in Askew.
The Eastern District brushed aside the Supreme Court's holding in,
and the plaintiff's reliance on, the Court's decision in Askew. The
Eastern District justified this result by focusing on the fact that the
statute at issue in Askew, allowed the state and private individuals
the right to recover damages from oil spills that occurred within
the state's territorial waters. 53 The Eastern District took notice of
the "savings clauses" of the OPA which prevent preemption of state
laws in determining liability for oil spill damages, but glossed over
them by stating, "[a]lthough the Supreme Court observed that the
savings clause in OPA preserved state statutes relative to liability, it
did not declare a rule so broad as to allow state liability statutes to
apply to oil spills outside of state water." 54 In this way, the Eastern
District's decision in the MDL litigation is similar to the Middle
District's decision in Askew.

50

51
52
53
54

In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on
April 20, 2010 (Deepwater Horizon), 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (E.D. La. 2011)
Q.P.M.L. 2010) (creating MDL No. 2179). Multidistrict Litigation is a process
by which similar cases, usually resulting from products liability claims or claims
resulting from a natural disaster, are consolidated in one federal district court
for all pretrial and discovery work. If a case is not settled during this pretrial
and discovery period, it is remanded back to the district court from which it
came for trial. However, because of the complexity and magnitude of many
claims involved in multidistrict litigations, many, if not most cases, are settled at
the pretrial and discovery phase. For more information regarding multidistrict
litigation, see Thomas E. Willging and Emery G. Lee, III, From Class Actions to
Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KA
L. REv. 775, 777 (2010).
Deepwater Horizon, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 953-54.
Id. at 954 n.7.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 957.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol92/iss2/18

8

Smith: Like Oil and Water: The Past, Present, and Future of American Wat

LIKE OIL AND WATER

359

To further bolster its conclusion, the Eastern District relied
on the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in International Paper Co.
v. OueUette. 55 The Ouellette case involved the question of whether
a state common law nuisance action may be brought in the
state where the nuisance occurs if the source of the nuisance,
presumably pollution, originates in another state. 56 The case also
involved the issue of whether such a state common law action is
preempted by the federal Clean Water Act. 57 In deciding the case,
the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that a state common law claim
was permissible regarding pollution of the type regulated by the
Clean Water Act; however, it held that the law of the state where
the pollution originated was the correct law under which to bring
the claim. 58 The Eastern District reasoned that since the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill originated in federal waters, the only applicable
law under which to bring a claim was federal maritime law, thus
finding "it appropriate to limit state-law claims purportedly saved
by OPA," even though such limitations had not previously been
applied.59 It againjustified its determination by invoking the need
for uniformity in national maritime law, 60 just as the Middle District
did in Askew. 61 In limiting the state law claims available under OPA,
though, the Eastern District overlooked important nuances in the
existing case law. In Oullette, the Supreme Court was concerned
about the uniformity of the law; if states were permitted to set
their own pollution standards through common law adjudication,
confusion would overcome the Clean Water Act's carefully drawn
standards.62 However, no such risk exists under OPA.
State statutes, like the ones with which the Eastern District
were confronted, would not undermine a carefully drawn federal
regulatory scheme since these statutes only allow states and
individuals to obtain adequate compensation for damages caused by
oil spills and would not undermine a presently existing, prospective
federal regulatory scheme. This latter view is more in line with

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 956.
See lnt' I Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
Id. at 483.
Id. at 487.
Deepwater Horizon, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
Id.
Am. Waterways, 335 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing Southern Pac. Co. v Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 218 (1918)).
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 496.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Askew. 63 More importantly, the
Eastern District seemingly brushed aside part of the congressional
i_n tent in enacting OPA, namely, allowing states to enact pertinent
legislation in the area of oil spill recovery, 64 which the Supreme
Court, in its decision in the appeal from the Middle District's
decision in Askew, said is permissible. In fact, when enacting OPA,
preemption was the most frequently discussed topic in Congress, 65
and after this protracted discussion, Congress explicitly included
the savings clauses, thus preventing federal preemption of state
statutes permitting recovery for damages sustained from oil spills. 66
Therefore, the current status, and underlying rationale, of
the Middle District's decision in Askew may, unfortunately, be
experiencing a revival. While the Supreme Court's ruling in the
appeal from the Middle District's decision has enjoyed a resurgence
of recognition by the plaintiffs' bar in the wake of catastrophic
oil spills such as Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon, its status
among federal courts seems less certain, and as evidenced by
the Eastern District's recent decision, lower federal courts seem
to again be embracing the Middle District's rationale. However,
for now, based upon the Supreme Court's decision in the appeal
from the Middle District's decision in Askew, it is clear that unless
expressly preempted, states have the power to legislate in the area
of recovery for damages from oil spills that occur within their
territorial waters. Less clear, however, are states' powers to legislate
regarding recovery for damages from oil spills that do not originate
within their respective jurisdictions. It seems, based on the
Supreme Court's trend of expanding the non-exclusivity of federal
maritime jurisdiction that states will be allowed to legislate in order
to recover damages from oil spills unless to do so would undermine
a federal regulative scheme. This includes damages from spills that
do not originate from within their jurisdictions.67 However, the

63
64
65
66
67

See Askew, 411 U.S. at 325.
See Valerio Spinaci, L essons from BP: Deepwater Oil Drilling as an Abnormally
Dangerous A ctivity, 35 NOVA L. REv. 803 , 812 (2011).
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 101-94, at 17 (1989)).
Id.; see also Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No . 101-380 § 1018(a) (1), 104
Stat. 484, 505 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1) (2006)).
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking
the Theory of Damages in a Market Economy, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1o5 3, 107 5 ( 2o 1 1 )
(discussing proposed reforms for damage recovery within the oil spill context).
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need for uniformity and the massive amount of damages being
sought across several jurisdictions may again cause courts to lend a
sympathetic ear to the Middle District's decision in Askew.
Certainly, the Eastern District of Louisiana is doing so, even
if it does not explicitly, or tacitly, admit this fact. Still, the Eastern
District's concern with the need for uniformity in federal maritime
law, in this instance, seems tenuous, at best, since only five states
border the Gulf of Mexico. 68 Certainly, allowing these five states to
provide recovery for their citizens beyond that allowed by the OPA
would not undermine a federal legislative scheme. While only time
will tell what the ultimate impact of the Middle District's decision in
Askew will be on states' ability to regulate the recovery of damages
from oil spills, one fact is certain; federal and state attempts to
simultaneously regulate damage recovery from oil spills often go
together as well as oil and water.

68

These states include Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi , and Texas.
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